Merge: CVE-2025-38498 fix permission checks for mount propagation change

MR: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/src/kernel/centos-stream-10/-/merge_requests/1373

JIRA: https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-107307
CVE: CVE-2025-38498

An inconsistent application of capabilities checking was discovered
in the kernel.

An initial patch was proposed and merged but regressions were reported.
An additional patch was posted that makes this permission checking
consistent over the two areas it's used and eliminates the regression.

The risk was that the reported regression would almost certainly have
serious affects for our container products (at the least) so we needed
to wait for this second patch.

Signed-off-by: Ian Kent <ikent@redhat.com>

Approved-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Approved-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Approved-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Approved-by: CKI KWF Bot <cki-ci-bot+kwf-gitlab-com@redhat.com>

Merged-by: CKI GitLab Kmaint Pipeline Bot <26919896-cki-kmaint-pipeline-bot@users.noreply.gitlab.com>

Author: CKI KWF Bot

fs/namespace.c

@@ -2673,6 +2673,19 @@ static int graft_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *p, struct mountpoint *mp)
 	return attach_recursive_mnt(mnt, p, mp, 0);
 }
 
+static int may_change_propagation(const struct mount *m)
+{
+        struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns;
+
+	 // it must be mounted in some namespace
+	 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ns))         // is_mounted()
+		 return -EINVAL;
+	 // and the caller must be admin in userns of that namespace
+	 if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		 return -EPERM;
+	 return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Sanity check the flags to change_mnt_propagation.
  */
@@ -2709,6 +2722,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	namespace_lock();
+	err = may_change_propagation(mnt);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
 	if (type == MS_SHARED) {
 		err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse);
 		if (err)
@@ -3102,18 +3119,11 @@ static int do_set_group(struct path *from_path, struct path *to_path)
 
 	namespace_lock();
 
-	err = -EINVAL;
-	/* To and From must be mounted */
-	if (!is_mounted(&from->mnt))
-		goto out;
-	if (!is_mounted(&to->mnt))
-		goto out;
-
-	err = -EPERM;
-	/* We should be allowed to modify mount namespaces of both mounts */
-	if (!ns_capable(from->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	err = may_change_propagation(from);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
-	if (!ns_capable(to->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	err = may_change_propagation(to);
+	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
 	err = -EINVAL;